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Abstract
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning introduced by Jon Barwise and
John Perry. It has evoked great theoretical and practical interest and motivated the
framework of a few `computational' systems. PROSIT is the pioneering work in this
direction. Unfortunately, there is a lack of real-life applications on these systems and this
study is a preliminary attempt to remedy this deciency. Here, we examine how much
PROSIT reects situation-theoretic concepts and solve a group of epistemic puzzles using
the constructs provided by this programming language.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Situation theory is a principled programme to develop a mathematical theory of meaning
which aims to clarify and resolve some tough problems in the study of language, infor-
mation, logic, and philosophy [7]. It was introduced by Jon Barwise and John Perry
and stimulated great interest [8]. The theory matured within the last ten years or so
[5, 14, 15, 36, 52, 53] and various versions of it have been applied to a number of linguistic
issues [17], resulting in what is commonly known as situation semantics. This was followed
by assorted studies on the computational aspects of the theory, which gave birth to a group
of computational systems based on situation theory [32, 33, 35, 44, 48, 46, 50, 49, 9, 10].
PROSIT (PROgramming in SItuation Theory), developed by Nakashima et al.
[32, 33, 35], is the pioneering work in this direction. Therefore, it is worth examining
how much PROSIT reects situation-theoretic concepts and how much it deviates from
them. PROSIT seems to be especially suitable for writing programs simulating human-
like (commonsense) reasoning [28, 29]. Unfortunately, there have been very few attempts
to employ PROSIT in this style. Such a study is, however, of great importance, and
would help us see where and why we should utilize systems based on situation theory, and
how we should go about formulating a situation-theoretic programming paradigm [48, 46].
In fact, as far as we know, the only remarkable application in which PROSIT has been
eectively exploited is the \Three Wisemen Problem" [32]. This is a problem involving
common knowledge (mutual information) in a multi-agent setting. Pinning our faith upon
situation theory, we tried to make use of PROSIT in the solution of what we came to call
`epistemic puzzles' [19, 26, 30, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42]. Throughout this paper the nature of
epistemic puzzles and their solution via a situation-theoretic world-view will be analyzed.
A short introduction to situation theory and situation semantics, and two other compu-
tational systems (ASTL and BABY-SIT) will be oered in the next two chapters, respec-
tively. This is followed by a detailed review of PROSIT, where a section is devoted to the
comparison of PROSIT and bona de situation theory. The fth chapter explains what
epistemic puzzles look like, how they have been solved using classical approaches, and why
the situated model ts best to model and solve these puzzles. The discussion is supported
with a great variety of puzzles, some of which are introduced by Raymond Smullyan in his
book Forever Undecided: A Puzzle Guide to Godel [42]. (Also cf. [38, 39, 40] for similar
puzzles.) The discussion ends with a conclusion and proposed future work.
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Chapter 2
Situation Theory and Situation
Semantics
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning. It was introduced by Barwise and
Perry in their book Situations and Attitudes [8] and evoked great theoretical and practical
interest.
Barwise and Perry were aware of the limitations of classical logic and contended that
the standard view of logic is inappropriate for many of the uses to which it has been put
by semanticists. There have been dierent approaches to building theories of natural lan-
guage. Some of these theories emphasized the power of language to classify minds, i.e., the
mental signicance of language, while others focused on the connections between language
and the described world, i.e., the external signicance of language. However, Barwise and
Perry claim that for an expression to have meaning, it should convey information. This
is possible, only if the expressions have a link with the kinds of events they describe and
also a link with the states of mind. They develop a theory of situations and of meaning as
a relation between situations. The theory provides a system of abstract objects that help
describe the meaning of both expressions and mental states in terms of the information
they carry about the external world.
Keith Devlin [17], who spared considerable eort on the formalization of the theory, also
regards situation theory as a theory of information. Rather than try to dene information,
he investigated the nature of information ow [18] and the mechanisms that gave rise to
such ow.
The evolution of situation theory can be regarded as a move away from conventional
logics which only have relatively simple objects in the semantic domain to more com-
plex semantic objects. Within this movement, although at the beginning there was little
distinction, today there is a split between situation theory|the formal aspects of the
theory, such as mathematical, logical, philosophical, proof theoretic, etc.|and situation
semantics|the application of situation theory to the semantics of natural language.
The information-based approach to the semantics of natural languages has resulted
in what is known as situation semantics. The primary idea situation semantics is based
on is that language is used to convey information about the world. Two sentences with
the same interpretation|describing the same situation|can carry dierent information.
Context-dependence, which was underestimated in classical approaches to semantics, is
the essential hypothesis of situation semantics. Indexicals, demonstratives, tenses, and
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other linguistic devices rely heavily on context for their interpretation [1]. Therefore, a
sentence can be used over and over again in dierent situations to say dierent things. Its
interpretation is subordinate to the situation in which the sentence is uttered.
The framework of situation theory mainly consists of the things an (intelligent) agent is
able to discriminate using his cognitive abilities. The basic ingredients of this framework
are
 Individuals, which are considered as entities that are individuated as `objects'
 Properties that hold or fail to hold for some of these individuals
 Relations that hold or fail to hold among some of those individuals
 Spatial and temporal locations that are points in regions of space and time.
The two major notions of situation theory are infons and situations. Infons are the
basic informational units. They should be considered as discrete items of information.
Infons are denoted as  P; a
1
; : : :a
n
; i  where P is an n-place relation, a
1
; : : :a
n
are
objects appropriate for the respective argument places of P , and i is the polarity (0 or 1).
It is possible to use spatial and temporal locations in the argument places of relations.
The following infon states the fact that Bob is married to Carol at time t:
married-to,Bob,Carol,t,1
Situations are `rst-class' citizens of the theory. There is no clear-cut denition of
what a situation exactly is. Rather, a situation is considered to be a structured part of
the Reality that a cognitive agent somehow manages to pick out (individuate). Situations
support facts:
s supports  (s j= ) means that  is an infon that is true of situation s.
A simple example would be
S
1
j=running,Bob,1
which states that Bob is running in situation S
1
.
One should note that the truth or falsity of a fact does not depend on the supports
relation but is handled by the notion of polarity. Therefore
S
1
6j=running,Bob,1
does not imply
S
1
j=running,Bob,0
One of the primary motivations for situation theory was sentences of the form
Bob is angry.
Bob is angry and Bob is shouting or Bob is not shouting.
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In conventional classical logic there is no way to distinguish between these two sentences.
They are considered to be logically equivalent, because any truth assignment that makes
the former true will also make the latter true. However, intuitively there seems to be a
dierence. In situation theory situations are partial, i.e., they do not dene the truth or
falsity of all relations on all objects in the domain. Permitting partiality, the theory can
distinguish between those sentences that look logically equivalent. In situation semantics
these two sentences will have dierent interpretations. The rst one will be represented
by a situation, S, in which Bob is angry. S does not state anything about (is not aware
of) Bob's shouting or not. Another situation, S
0
, represents the second sentence. S
0
is
the `union' of two situations: the situation in which Bob is angry and shouting, and the
situation in which Bob is angry and not shouting.
It is desirable to have some computational tools to handle situations. Abstract situa-
tions are the mathematical constructs with which we can model analogs of real situations.
They are more amenable to mathematical manipulation. An abstract situation is dened
to be a set of infons. Given a real situation s the set f j s j= g is the corresponding
abstract situation.
An important feature of situation theory is the existence of types. Types are higher-
order uniformities which cut across individuals, relations, situations, and spatial and tem-
poral locations. Just as individuals, temporal locations, spatial locations, relations, and
situations, types are also discriminated by cognitive agents. In this framework, relations
may have their argument places lled either with individuals, situations, locations, and
other relations or with types of individuals, situations, locations, and relations. For ex-
ample, if an agent sees smoke he can conclude that there is re. For he is aware of the
constraint which links situations where there is smoke to those where there is re. Thus,
the constraint links types of situations, viz. smoky-type of situations to ones with re.
The development of types brings the requirement of devices for making reference to
arbitrary objects of a given type. Therefore for each type T , an innite collection of
parameters T
1
; T
2
; : : : is introduced. For example IND
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is an IND-parameter (parameters
of type IND). Given a SIT-parameter, SIT
i
, and a set of infons, I , the following denotes
a situation-type, the type of situation in which conditions in I are satised:
[SIT
i
j SIT
i
j= I ]
For example,
[SIT
1
j SIT
1
j=running,Bob,LOC
1
,TIM
1
; 1]
denotes the type of situation in which Bob is running at some location and at some time.
These parameters already carry some computational power, but we need more than that.
Rather than parameters ranging over all individuals, we need parameters that range over
a more limited class. Such parameters are called restricted parameters. Given a basic
parameter, v, and a condition, C, on v, a restricted parameter v " C is dened. This is of
the same basic type as v and satises the requirements imposed by C. For example,
_
b = IND
2
"football, IND
2
; 1
_a = IND
3
" fman, IND
3
; 1;kicking, IND
3
,
_
b; 1g
Once dened,
_
b ranges over all footballs and _a over all men kicking footballs.
In addition, it is possible to obtain new types using a parameter, s, and a set, I , of
infons (in the form [s j s j= I ]). For example,
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[SIT
1
j SIT
1
j=kicking, _a;
_
b; 1]
represents a situation-type where a man is kicking a football and
[ _a j SIT
1
j=kicking, _a;
_
b; 1]
denotes the type of men kicking a football.
In situation theory, the ow of information is realized by a certain group of infons called
constraints. A situation s will carry information relative to the constraint C = [S ) S
0
],
if s : S[f ], where f anchors the parameters in S and S
0
. Hence, the information carried
by s relative to C is that there is a situation s
0
, possibly extending s, of type S
0
[f ].
This introduction on situation theory and situation semantics will be nished by a
previous example about constraints.
S
0
= [ _s
0
j _s
0
j=smoke-present,
_
l;
_
t; 1]
S
1
= [ _s
1
j _s
1
j=re-present,
_
l;
_
t; 1]
C = [S
0
) S
1
],
In this example, C is a constraint that links situations where there is re, S
1
, to
situations where there is smoke, S
0
. An agent who is aware of (attuned to) this constraint
will infer that there is a re whenever he perceives smoke.
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Chapter 3
Computational Situation Theory
Currently, there are three systems based on situation theory. PROSIT, developed by
Nakashima et al. [32, 33, 35], is the pioneering work in this direction. This was followed
by the development of ASTL by Black [9, 10]. Another computational medium based on
situations called BABY-SIT is currently being built at Bilkent University by Akman and
Tn [44, 48, 46]. PROSIT is primarily aimed at general problems of knowledge represen-
tation, while ASTL is developed for experiments in natural language processing. On the
other hand, BABY-SIT will hopefully handle problems of both sorts. In the following
sections brief explanations of ASTL and BABY-SIT will be given. Because the epistemic
puzzles in this paper are implemented on PROSIT, a separate chapter is devoted to explain
that language.
3.1 ASTL
ASTL (A Situation Theoretic Language) is a situation theoretic language developed by
Alan Black in 1991. It was primarily designed to make experiments on semantic theories
of natural language. Black chose situation theory as a basis for his system because it pro-
vides a general and potentially powerful formalism on which theories of natural language
processing could be implemented. The system consists of an interpreter (implemented
in Common Lisp) that passes over the ASTL denitions to make inference and answer
queries about a set of constraints and basic situations.
3.1.1 Syntax and Semantics of ASTL
Similar to many logic programming languages, ASTL has a syntax that consists of terms
and sentences. Terms can be simple or complex. Simple terms are used to denote indi-
viduals (e.g., a, b), relations (e.g., happy, sees), parameters (e.g., X, Y), and variables
(e.g., *P, *R). Complex terms are built up from simple terms. The complex terms and
their notations are as follows.
I-terms are used to represent the basic informational units, i.e., infons. The syntax is
<<rel; arg
1
; : : : ; arg
n
; polarity>> where rel is a relation of arity n, arg
1
to arg
n
are the
terms that stand for the arguments of the relation, and polarity denotes the polarity of
the infon. For example, an infon stating the fact that Bob is singing may be represented
by the following i-term:
6
<<singing,bob,1>>
Types are complex terms denoting the types of situations. They are represented as
[parameter ! condition
1
: : : condition
n
] where each condition has the form parameter !=
i-term. For example, the following represents a situation type where Bob is happy and
Carol is sad.
[S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>> S != <<sad,carol,1>>]
Situations are represented by atomic names which are optionally followed by a type
(separated by a double colon). An example for a situation would be
SIT1 :: [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>> S != <<smiling,bob,1>>]
Here SIT1 is of type S, i.e., it is a situation where Bob is happy and smiling.
ASTL sentences are dened using the simple and complex terms. It should be noted
however, that sentences are distinct from terms and cannot be used as arguments to
relations. The following are some of the basic ASTL sentence types.
Propositions are situation names followed by types, separated by a single colon. For
example,
SIT2 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>> S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
indicates that both Bob and Carol are happy in situation SIT2.
Constraints are the primary tools that are used in inferencing. They are dened between
propositions, and are of the form sit
0
: type
0
<= sit
1
: type
1
; : : : ; sit
n
: type
n
where each sit
i
is a situation name or a variable and type
i
is a type. The following example demonstrates
a constraint which states that whenever Bob is smiling, he is happy:
*S : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>] <= *S : [S ! S != <<smiling,bob,1>>]
Grammar rules are a special kind of constraints and have a similar semantics. They
are of the form sit
0
: type
0
-> sit
1
: type
1
; : : : ; sit
n
: type
n
. An example is
*S : [S ! S != <<category,*S,Sentence,1>>] ->
*NP : [S ! S != <<category,*NP,NounPhrase,1>>],
*VP : [S ! S != <<category,*VP,VerbPhrase,1>>].
This grammar rule should be interpreted as follows: if there is a situation *NP of the
given type and a situation *VP of the given type then there is also a situation *S of the
given type.
3.1.2 Inference in ASTL
The primary sentences used to make inference are the constraints. ASTL has ve infer-
ence rules using which it answers non-trivial questions about the described models. The
following paragraphs explain these inference rules and oer examples.
Type reduction aims to break down a type with more than one condition into pieces.
For example the situation
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SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>> S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
is also a situation of the following types:
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>]
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
Type combination is the reverse of type reduction, i.e., it combines single condition
propositions of the same situation. For example, if the following propositions are true
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>]
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<dancing,bob,1>> S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
then the following proposition is also true
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>> S != <<dancing,bob,1>> S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
Modus ponens derives the conclusion of a constraint if the premise(s) is (are) satised.
So, if we have a constraint and a proposition such as
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>] <= SIT2 : [S ! S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
SIT2 : [S ! S != <<singing,bob,1>>]
then ASTL deduces the following proposition
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>]
Argument promotion allows the proper treatment of typed situations as arguments in
facts. For example, using the following constraint and proposition
SIT0 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>] <=
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<sees,bob, SIT2 :: [S ! S != <<happy,carol,1>>],1>>]
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<sees,bob,SIT2,1>>]
it is possible to deduce the following constraint
SIT0 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>] <= SIT2 : [S ! S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
ASTL also has a mechanism to handle cyclic constraint denitions. It is possible to
deduce
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>]
using the following constraint and proposition:
*S : [S ! S != <<happy,bob,1>>] <=
*S : [S ! S != <<sees,bob,*S,1>> S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
SIT1 : [S ! S != <<sees,bob,SIT1,1>> S != <<happy,carol,1>>]
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3.1.3 Applications
Sentences are parsed in ASTL according to the situation theoretic grammar (STG) de-
scribed by Cooper [13], and situation-theoretic representations of them are built. In this
grammar, situations are used to represent actual utterances. These are called utterance
situations. Using utterance situations it is possible to write situation-theoretic constraints.
Because ASTL is aimed at natural language processing, it has special constructs to handle
utterance situations. Rather than using constraints and fully specifying all connections
in an utterance, i.e., the order of words, grammar rules are used. Grammar rules are a
special form of constraints which are more compact and are more ecient to use.
For example, the following constraint states that, if there is a situation that supports
the fact that it is a noun phrase, and a situation that is a verb phrase, and that the noun
phrase is connected to a point which the verb phrase starts from (*Mid), then there is a
situation which is a sentence:
*S : [S ! S != <<category,S,Sentence,1>>
S != <<connected,S,*Start,*End,1>>
S != <<uttsit,S,1>>
S != <<daughters,S,*NP,*VP,1>>]
<=
*NP : [S ! S != <<category,S,NounPhrase,1>>]
S != <<uttsit,S,1>>
S != <<connected,S,*Start,*Mid,1>>
*VP : [S ! S != <<category,S,VerbPhrase,1>>]
S != <<uttsit,S,1>>
S != <<connected,S,*Mid,*End,1>>
On the other hand, using grammar rules it is easier to represent the same constraint
as,
*S : [S ! S != <<category,S,Sentence,1>>
S != <<daughters,S,*NP,*VP,1>>]
->
*NP : [S ! S != <<category,S,NounPhrase,1>>]
*VP : [S ! S != <<category,S,VerbPhrase,1>>]
ASTL has been used as a meta-language for several important semantic theories. One
of these semantic theories is the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) by Kamp [25],
that introduces the notion of discourse representation structure which can be considered as
representing states in the discourse. Another one is the Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL)
[20] which views semantics of an expression as a relation between an input state and an
output state. These semantic theories have been implemented and have been compared
using the constructs of ASTL. Although ASTL reects a small part of situation theory,
i.e., infons, situations, and constraints, it has been successful enough to oer useful ideas.
3.2 BABY-SIT
BABY-SIT is a computational medium based on situations. It is currently being de-
veloped at Bilkent University in KEE
TM
(Knowledge Engineering Environment) on a
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SPARCstation
TM
. BABY-SIT is mainly aimed at developing and testing programs in
domains ranging from linguistics to articial intelligence within a framework built upon
situation theoretic constructs.
3.2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The computational model of BABY-SIT consists of nine primitive domains: individuals,
times, places, relations, polarities, parameters, infons, situations, and types. Each of
these primitive domains has its own internal structure. Individuals are unique atomic
entities. They correspond to the objects in the world. Times are used to represent
temporal locations and are a distinguished type of individuals. Similar to times, places are
individuals that represent spatial locations. Relations correspond to relations that hold
between objects in the world. They have certain argument roles which must be occupied by
appropriate objects. Polarities represent the truth values of relations. Infons are discrete
items of information and are of the form <<rel; arg
1
; : : : ; arg
n
; pol>>, where rel is a relation,
arg
i
, 1  i  n is an object of the appropriate type for the ith argument role, and pol is the
polarity. Parameters are `place holders' of the objects in the model. Using parameters one
can refer to arbitrary objects of a given type. (Abstract) situations are sets of parametric
infons. Types are higher-order uniformities that individuate (discriminate) objects in the
world. BABY-SIT oers nine primitive types: IND (individuals), TIM (times), LOC
(places), REL (relations), POL (polarities), INF (infons), PAR (parameters), SIT
(situations), and TYP (types).
BABY-SIT oers two modes of interaction with the system. The assertion mode pro-
vides an interactive environment where one can dene objects and their types, and assert
infons into situations. The query mode enables one to issue queries about the existing
situations.
In the following example, it is asserted that bob and mary are individuals, loves is a
relation, and sit1 is a situation. I> is the prompt of the assertion mode:
I> bob: IND
I> mary: IND
I> loves: REL
I> sit1: SIT
To state the fact that Bob loves Mary in a situation the following assertion is made:
I> sit1 |= <<loves,bob,mary,1>>
Queries are handled by either direct querying through situations, i.e., using the existing
infons in situations, or by the application of backward-chaining constraints (explained in
the next section). BABY-SIT oers dierent types of queries that can be controlled by
the user:
 Searching for solutions by using a given group of constraints.
 Replacing each parameter in the query expression by the corresponding individual
if there is a possible anchor.
 Returning a specied number of solutions.
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 Displaying solutions with the parameters replaced with the corresponding individu-
als.
 Displaying a trace of the anchoring of parameters in each solution.
A simple query asking for the person Bob loves would be
Q> sit1 |= <<loves,bob,?X,1>>
to which the system will respond
sit1 |= <<loves,bob,mary,1>>
3.2.2 Inference
In BABY-SIT, inference is made via constraints. Constraints can be forward-chaining,
backward-chaining, and both forward- and backward-chaining. Each constraint has an
identier and is a member of a group of constraints. The following constraint has the
identier BEING and is a member of the constraint group BEING-PERSPECTIVE. It states
that every man is a human.
BEING-PERSPECTIVE:
BEING:
?S |= <<human,?X,1>>
<=
?S |= <<man,?X,1>>
Constraints can be either global or situated; i.e., they can be applied to all situations
or to a specic one. It is also possible to add some background constraints which must
be satised for the constraint to apply. For example, the following constraint states that
balls fall if they are not supported, but only if there is gravity:
NATURAL-LAW-PERSPECTIVE:
FALLING-BALL:
?S1 |= <<ball,?X,1>>,
?S1 |= <<supported,?X,0>>
=>
?S2 |= <<falls,?X,1>>
UNDER-CONDITIONS:
w: f<<exists,gravity,1>>g
(w denotes the background situation.) This is the situation from which all the other
real-life situations normally inherit.
Forward chaining constraints are activated whenever their antecedents are satised.
All the consequences are then asserted. New assertions may in turn activate other for-
ward chaining constraints. A backward chaining constraint is activated when a query is
made about its consequence. The system then tries to satisfy all the antecedents of the
constraint.
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3.2.3 Applications
BABY-SIT has been used to resolve pronominal anaphoric expressions in Turkish [50].
This process can be dened as nding the antecedent and referent of an anaphoric expres-
sion. Consider the following examples:
(1) Bilge bana [; hastalandgn]- soyledi.
(2) Erol maca gelmeyecek. Bilge bana [; hastalandgn]- soyledi.
In the rst example, the zero anaphor expression, ;, being the subject of the embedded
sentence will take the subject of the main sentence, Bilge, as its antecedent. However, in
the second example, the rst sentence supplying the context, the antecedent of the zero
anaphor is the subject of the previous sentence, i.e., Erol.
As a starting point, the existing syntactic approaches to resolve pronominal anaphora
for isolated sentences has been implemented in BABY-SIT. This was followed by the
generation of simple syntactic rules to resolve the issue across sentence boundaries. An
example for such a rule would be: \if the subject of the main sentence is represented by a
zero pronoun, then it co-refers with the subject of the immediately preceding sentence."
The procedure BABY-SIT follows in resolving anaphora can be summarized as follows.
Each linguistic expression is considered as an utterance situation. Therefore, for each
linguistic expression in a sentence type of utterance situation is dened. The situation
that represents the whole sentence is designated by the composition of the situations of its
sub-utterances. There is also a group of constraints that place restriction on the existing
environment. An example for such a constraint would be: \if there is an utterance situation
of the word `AYNUR', then it must represent a female human being." Additionally, there
is a background situation that contains information about the utterer and the addressee.
After all the utterance situations are asserted and the constraints are satised, rules that
encode syntactic control of zero anaphora are exploited to resolve the anaphora.
BABY-SIT has also been used to implement the causal theories of Shoham [37], and
their extensions proposed by Tn and Akman [45]. These theories were tested on a group
of problems, one of which is the famous Yale Shooting Problem (YSP). This is a puzzle pro-
posed by Hanks and McDermott [21] as a paradigm to show how the temporal projection
problem arises:
At some point in time, a person, Fred, is alive. A loaded gun, after waiting for
a while, is red at Fred. What are the results of this action?
One expects that Fred would die and that the gun would be unloaded after the ring.
But Hanks and McDermott [22] demonstrate in the framework of (among other formalisms)
circumscription, that unintended minimal models are obtained; the gun gets unloaded
during the waiting stage and ring the gun does not kill Fred.
Causal theories try to reason about the eects of such actions. Proceeding in time, the
causal inference mechanism tries to obtain knowledge about future using what is known
(and what is not known) about the past. The axioms of causal theories are translated
into infons and constraints in BABY-SIT. For example, the following constraint is, in fact,
the translation of the axiom stating that if a gun is loaded at some point in time it will
continue to be loaded unless someone res it or manually empties it:
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GUNFIRE:
R3:
?S1 |= <<loaded,?G,1>>
=>
?S3 |= <<loaded,?G,1>>,
?S1 |= <<successor,?S3,?S1,1>>
UNDER-CONDITIONS:
?S1: f<<fires,?M,?G,0>>,
<<emptied-manually,?G,0>>,
<<successor,?S2,?S1,0>>g
Both Shoham's causal theories, and Tn and Akman's [47] extensions that permit si-
multaneity have been successfully modeled and compared in BABY-SIT.
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Chapter 4
PROSIT
PROSIT [32, 33, 35] is a declarative language in which both programs and data are just sets
of infons. This feature makes PROSIT akin to Prolog, but PROSIT is based on situation
theory rather than Horn clauses. The motivation behind the design of this language rests
on the following desirable features, each of which is supported by the theory:
 The use of partially specied objects and partial information
 Situations as rst-class citizens
 Situatedness of information and constraints
 Informational constraints
 Self-referential expressions
These features provide the necessary power to analyze semantic phenomena in natural
language. PROSIT also oers tools for knowledge representation, interactive querying,
and deduction, which are important components of a programming environment.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
Expressions in PROSIT are either atoms or lists. Atoms that are numbers (2, 3.5,
527, etc.) or strings (``hello'', ``enter'', etc.) are considered to be constants,
whereas atoms that are symbols (FOO, *A, B44, etc.) are regarded either as parameters
or variables. Lists are similar to Lisp lists, i.e., they are a series of atoms or lists separated
by spaces and enclosed by parentheses, as in (A (B C (D)) E).
Parameters are Lisp symbols starting with a character other than \*" .They are used to
represent things that cannot be captured by PROSIT constants, such as objects, situations,
and relations. Usually, dierent parameters correspond to dierent entities. Parameters
can be used in any infon (including queries and constraints); their scope is global.
Symbols starting with \*" are variables. Variables are place-holders that stand for any
PROSIT expression. They only appear in queries and constraints; their scope is local to
the constraint or query they participate in. If a variable is bound to a certain value, then
in the later parts of the same constraint or query, those variables are replaced with their
value unless the system backtracks.
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In PROSIT, an infon is represented as a list whose rst element is the symbol for a
relation and whose remaining elements are the objects for which the relation holds:
(relation object
1
: : :object
n
)
For example, the infon
(listening to John Mary)
expresses that the relation listening to holds between the objects represented by the
parameters John and Mary, i.e., John is listening to Mary.
One can assert infons, and query a knowledge base incorporating, among other things,
infons. Unlike Prolog, all infons are local to situations. For example, to assert the infon
mentioned above into a situation, sit1, the following expression is used:
(!= sit1 (listening to John Mary))
In PROSIT, there exists a tree hierarchy among all situations, with the situation top at
the root of the tree. top is the global situation and the `owner' of all the other situations
generated. One can traverse the `situation tree' using the predicates in and out. Although
it is possible to issue queries from any situation about any other situation, the result will
depend on where the query is made. If a situation sit2 is dened in the current situation,
say sit1, then sit1 is said to be the owner of sit2, or equivalently:
 sit2 is a part of sit1, or
 sit1 describes sit2
The owner relation states that if (!= sit2 infon) holds in sit1, then infon holds in
sit2, and conversely, if infon holds in sit2 then (!= sit2 infon) holds in sit1.
in causes the interpreter to go to a specied situation which will be a part of the `current
situation' (the situation in which the predicate is called). out causes the interpreter to go
to the owner of the current situation.
Similar to the owner relation there is the `subchunk' relation, denoted by ([ sit1
sit2), where sit1 is a subchunk of sit2, and conversely, sit2 is a `superchunk' of sit1.
When sit1 is asserted to be the subchunk of sit2 it means that sit1 is totally described
by sit2. A superchunk is like an owner (except that out will always cause the interpreter
to go to the owner, not to a superchunk).
PROSIT has two more relations that can be dened between situations. These are the
`subtype' and the `subsituation' relations. When the subtype relation, denoted by (@<
sit1 sit2)), is asserted, it causes the current situation to describe that sit2 supports
each infon valid in sit1 and that sit2 respects every constraint that is respected by sit1,
i.e., sit1 becomes a subtype of sit2. The subsituation relation, denoted by (<-- sit1
sit2), is the same as (@< sit1 sit2) except that only infons, but no constraints, are
inherited. Both relations are transitive.
A distinguishing feature of PROSIT is that the language allows circularity [6]. The
fact that PROSIT permits situations as arguments to infons makes it possible to write
self-referential statements. Consider a card game (sit) between two players. John has the
ace of spades and Mary has the queen of spades. When both players display their cards
the following infons will be factual:
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(!= sit (has John ace of spades))
(!= sit (has Mary queen of spades))
(!= sit (sees John sit))
(!= sit (sees Mary sit))
In this example the third and the fourth infons are circular, viz. sit supports facts in
which it appears as an argument.
4.2 Inference
The notion of informational constraints is a distinguishing feature that shaped the design of
PROSIT. Constraints can be considered as special types of information that `generate' new
facts. They are just a special case of infons, and therefore, are also situated. A constraint
can be specied using either of the three relations =>, <=, and <=>. Constraints specied
with => are forward-chaining. They are of the form (=> fact head
1
head
2
: : :head
n
). If fact
is asserted to the situation then all of the head facts are also asserted to that situation.
Constraints specied with <= are backward-chaining. They are of the form (<= head fact
1
fact
2
: : : fact
n
). If each of the facts from 1 to n are supported by the situation, then head is
also supported (though not asserted) by the same situation. Finally, constraints specied
with <=> should be considered as both backward- and forward-chaining.
If there is a constraint stating that \everything that smiles is happy" in situation sit1,
(resp sit1 (=> (smiles *X) (happy *X)))
then the assertion of
(smiles John)
in sit1 will force PROSIT to assert the following in sit1, too:
(happy John)
When an expression, expr, is queried, PROSIT tries to evaluate the query, binding
values to the variables in the query as the interpreter goes through the database. If this
process fails at any stage, PROSIT backtracks to the previous stage in the search of a
solution, and undoes all the bindings made along the incorrect path. The search will
succeed in two cases:
1. expr unies with an expression that is explicitly asserted in the current situation or
its subsituations.
2. expr unies with the head of a backward-chaining constraint (<= head fact
1
fact
2
: : : fact
n
) and nds a solution to all of fact
1
fact
2
: : : fact
n
, when queried in order.
PROSIT oers two types of unication. One is variable unication (V-unication),
the other is parameter unication (P-unication). V-unication is the one familiar from
Prolog and binds variables to objects. It occurs only in the query mode and its eects are
undone when PROSIT backtracks. P-unication occurs only in the assertion mode. It is
performed by explicitly stating that two parameters stand for the same object and can be
unied. P-unication is one of the major dierences between PROSIT and Prolog [12] in
which atoms never unify.
PROSIT's querying mechanism is exible. It is possible to use a variable in any part
of a query, even in the predicate name or the entire query.
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4.3 Applications
Although it oers a variety of constructs that can be used in inferencing for human-
like reasoning, there have been few attempts to employ PROSIT in this style. One of
the applications in which PROSIT was used is the treatment of identity. This aims to
demonstrate the role of parameters in situation theory.
Parameters are means to keep track of the correspondence between the concepts in
mind and real objects in the world, cf. Israel and Perry [24]. The idea can be exemplied
by the discussion about Cicero. The famous Roman orator Cicero's rst name is Tully.
For someone who knows this identity, the answer to the question \Is Tully an orator?"
would be yes. However, it is not possible to give the same answer for someone who is not
aware of this identity.
In PROSIT, it is possible to express the dierence between someone who knows the
identity of Cicero and Tully, and someone who does not. PROSIT overcomes this identity
problem by allowing assertions of situation-dependent equalities between parameters. This
is done by P-unifying two objects.
If an individual is aware of the identity of Cicero and Tully, his knowledge will be
classied by the situational parameter sit1 which supports the following facts.
(!= sit1 (= cicero tully))
(!= sit1 (orator cicero))
Here, the former is a P-unication which states that Cicero and Tully are the same
person; the latter states that Cicero is an orator.
On the other hand, the knowledge of someone who does not know this identity is
classied by sit2 where
(!= sit2 (orator cicero))
When asked the same questions in the two situations the system will respond
(!= sit1 (orator tully))
yes.
(!= sit2 (orator tully))
unknown.
A study on communication and inference through situations by Nakashima et al. [32],
was the most serious attempt to make use of PROSIT. The study was mainly aimed
to solve a problem that requires the cooperation of a group of agents in a multi-agent
setting. Situation theory was used as a framework to represent common knowledge [3].
The idea behind this choice was to exploit the foundations of situation theory for analyzing
information ow. Situation-theoretic principles were used to solve the \Three Wisemen
Problem" [32] which will be covered in the next chapter.
4.4 PROSIT versus Situation Theory
The development of programming languages based on situation theory is a new trend, so
it is worth examining how much PROSIT reects situation-theoretic concepts and how
much it deviates from them.
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PROSIT represents infons as lists and this is similar to the representation of infons
in situation theory. PROSIT has no special polarity argument in infons, but handles
this feature using the predicate no. Thus, (infon) represents a positive infon whereas
(no infon) stands for the negation of that infon. The only deciency regarding infons
in PROSIT appears in the notion of spatial and temporal locations. In PROSIT, it is
possible to use location-indicating parameters in the argument places of relations, but this
would be putting the individuals and locations in the same category. However, Devlin [17,
p. 35] remarks that \: : : infons are built up out of entities called relations, individuals,
locations, and polarities." Clearly, the majority of real-life facts pertain only to a certain
region of space and a certain interval of time, and it is desirable to handle (spatial and
temporal) locations.
PROSIT has situational parameters that are used to model abstract analogs of real sit-
uations. In that sense, they can be considered as abstract situations. They are associated
with sets of infons. The denition of supports changes to:
A situation s supports an infon i, if i is explicitly asserted to hold in s or can
be proved to hold by application of forward-chaining constraints in s.
As a result, supports reduces to simple set-membership and we can conclude that the
situations in PROSIT are equivalent to abstract situations. PROSIT also supports the
concept of constraints, but handles them in a dierent fashion. These come in three avors
in PROSIT: forward-chaining constraints, backward-chaining constraints, and forward-
and backward-chaining constraints. (This classication is nowhere to be found in situation
theory.) Built up on this classication, the designers of PROSIT came up with new
denitions [33, p. 493]:
An infon is supported by a situation if [it] is explicitly asserted to hold in
the situation, or can be proved to hold by application of forward-chaining
constraints in the situation.
An infon is permitted by a situation if [it] is deduced through application of
backward-chaining constraints.
It seems that this has no philosophical basis, but is oered because of implementation
requirements. In fact, both methods (forward or backward) result in the same answers to
queries. However, forward-chaining incurs a high cost at assertion-time, and backward-
chaining incurs a high cost at query-time. Additionally, forward-chaining requires more
computer memory. So what the expression \an infon is permitted in a situation" really
means is that, the infon is supported by the situation but there is either no need or no
space to store it. On the other hand, if implementation strategies are considered, it is a
good thing to have such choices. It is left to the user to select what kind of constraints to
use. For example, forward-chaining constraints can be used in applications where results
may not be predictable, and backward-chaining can be used in diagnostic problems [51].
There are two additional points on which the constraints of PROSIT have been criticized
(cf. Black [9, 10] and Tn [44]). The rst point is that PROSIT's constraints are situated
infon constraints, i.e., the constraints are about local facts within a situation rather than
about situation-types. While this criticism seems to be valid, it is possible to simulate
constraints that are not local to one situation (but are global). This can be achieved
by introducing a situation which is global to all other situations and then asserting the
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constraint in this global situation. Because all other situations will be in this global
situation, any constraint that is asserted here will apply to all situations. For example,
(! (resp TopSit
(<= (!= *Sit1 (touching *X *Y))
(!= *Sit1 (kissing *X *Y)))))
states that if there is a situation in TopSit that supports a fact about \kissing," then that
situation also supports a fact about \touching" on the same arguments.
The second criticism is that it is not possible to model conventional constraints in
PROSIT. However, none of the existing systems is capable of performing this either.
Situation theory provides notions such as types and parameters. In PROSIT, some of
these notions are hard to represent and some are not even possible. First of all, there
is no typing in PROSIT. A variable can match any parameter or constant without due
regard to types. In Chapter 2, we have dened
_
r1 as a restricted parameter ranging over
all men kicking footballs. Once dened,
_
r1 will represent this subclass of individuals.
But in PROSIT it is not possible to make this kind of parameter denitions that can be
used throughout a program. The only thing one can try is to pose queries on restricted
parameters. All men kicking footballs can be queried using the following expression:
(AND (kicking *a *b) (man *a) (football *b))
Although none of the variables above is restricted, the expression queries a restricted
class of individuals.
PROSIT has no mechanism to dene types either. As a consequence, there is a lack of
situation-types. We cannot dene a situation-type explicitly, i.e., there is no corresponding
expression for dening all men kicking footballs. On the other hand, PROSIT can query
a certain type of situation and put constraints between situation-types.
So the problem is that it is not possible to restrict a parameter or to assign a variable
to a certain type. This also makes it impossible to dene argument roles. Nevertheless,
this deciency does not prevent us from making queries about restricted parameters or
enforcing constraints between situation-types.
Recalling the previous section, one may wonder why there are two dierent relations
(owner and superchunk) doing very similar jobs. The major dierence between these
relations is not what the PROSIT manual [35, p. 15] says, i.e., that the predicate out will
take the interpreter to the owner not to the superchunk. More importantly, the owner
relation is dened between situations which are parent-child in the situation tree and the
superchunk relation between two situations that are siblings in this tree.
The other two relations (subtype and subsituation) should also be examined carefully.
At rst glance, it seems that there is a similarity between these relations and the concept of
inheritance in object-oriented programming [11]. However, in PROSIT the supersituation
inherits all the infons from the subsituation, whereas in object-oriented programming it is
the subclass that inherits the properties and methods from the superclass. Accordingly,
it can be concluded that either the direction of inheritance is completely dierent in two
paradigms or that the terms subsituation and subclass should not evoke object-oriented
concepts.
Regarding the question of where one can use these relations, the example given in the
PROSIT manual [35, p. 2] uses these relations to classify airplanes of type DC (DC-9,
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DC-10, and so on). But from the situation-theoretic point of view, it is not correct to
consider airplanes of type DC as a situation. An agent does not individuate DC type of
airplanes as a situation and say, DC-9s as a subsituation of that situation. These can only
be considered as a class and its subclass. This example surely suits well to object-oriented
programming, but not to situation theory. Accordingly, PROSIT needs to draw a clear
distinction between situations and classes.
One would be hard-pressed to nd anything about inheritance, supersituations, and
subsituations when one reads the essential documents on situation theory [8, 5, 17]. The
only thing that seems related to these concepts is the \part-of" relation which is dened
as follows [5, p. 185]:
A situation s
1
is a part of a situation s
2
(denoted as s
1
 s
2
) just in case every
basic state of aairs that is a fact of s
1
is also a fact of s
2
.
However if Sit
1
 Sit
2
is true, then the only comment we should make is that these
two are dening the same situation, and that Sit
2
oers a more ne-grained description
(using more infons than Sit
1
).
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Chapter 5
Situations and Epistemic Puzzles
5.1 Epistemic Puzzles
Epistemic puzzles deal with agents and their knowledge. This can be either in the form
of individual knowledge or common knowledge (mutual information) in a multi-agent
setting. The ontology of these puzzles include the agents whose knowledge we try to
represent, A = fa; b; c; : : :g, the knowledge each agent has, K = fK
a
; K
b
; K
c
; : : :g, and
the facts mentioned in the statement of the puzzle. If we let all the facts in a puzzle
make up the set F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
; : : :g (where each f
i
is a relation that holds among the
agents and objects that exist in the puzzle), then each K
i
is a subset of F . The primary
question to be answered in these epistemic puzzles is generally about the facts that the
agents are aware of. So a puzzle might ask if an agent, say x, is aware of the fact f
i
, i.e.,
whether f
i
2 K
x
is true. However, this representation fails to handle two main issues of
knowledge[3, 6]: the circularity of knowledge (i.e., if a knows f
3
, then he knows that he
knows f
3
, ad innitum) and deductive omniscience (i.e., if a knows that p and p entails q,
then a knows that q). For this representation to handle circularity of knowledge it should
be extended such that each K
i
is an element of itself. So if a knows the facts f
1
, f
3
, and
f
4
, then K
a
= ff
1
; f
3
; f
4
; K
a
g. To achieve deductive omniscience the denition of the facts
should be extended. In addition to simple relations that hold among agents, rules of the
form \if : : : then : : :" should also be considered as facts.
To elucidate the denitions above, we show how they can be used to represent common
knowledge. In a card game, John has the ace of spades and Mary has the queen of spades.
Jack comes and looking at her cards announces that Mary has the queen of spades. At
this point, each agent's knowledge is represented as follows:
K
john
= f(has john ace-of-spades), K
john
; K
common
g
K
mary
= fK
mary
; K
common
g
K
common
= f(has mary queen-of-spades), K
common
g
We now describe, via an example, what an epistemic puzzle looks like [34]:
Two logicians place cards on their foreheads so that what is written on the
card is visible only to the other logician. Consecutive positive integers have
been written on the cards. The following conversation ensues:
A: \I don't know my number."
B: \I don't know my number."
A: \I don't know my number."
B: \I don't know my number."
: : : n statements of ignorance later : : :
A or B: \I know my number."
What is on the card and how does the logician know it?
Note that the facts that we are after are restricted. We are only interested in the
numbers on the cards on the foreheads, not in the colors or shapes of the cards. Here,
both logicians know some facts, and as the conversation proceeds they generate new facts.
At the end, one of them nds out what the number on his forehead is. The aim of this
study is to simulate the way the agent holds information about the situation he happens
to be in and the way he reasons about this information.
There have been many attempts in AI to deal with knowledge and information, and
the most common tool used in tackling the fundamental problems posed by these con-
cepts was classical logic (predicate logic) or extensions of it such as modal, temporal, and
deontic logics [2, 23, 27]. All these attempts were of a strictly mathematical nature, and
therefore all were within the existing pure mathematics paradigm [5]. On the other hand,
situation theory emerged as a realistic theory of information. First, an empirical study
of information was made [17]. This was followed by both the application of the existing
mathematical techniques and the development of new mathematical tools. In that respect,
situation theory is tailor-made for problems involving knowledge and information.
In the following section, we will compare how the classical approach and the situated
approach handle epistemic puzzles.
5.2 Previous Approaches
In this section we will examine three dierent approaches used in solving epistemic puzzles.
First we will analyze how Smullyan solves his famous knights-and-knaves puzzles using
symbolic logic. In [42], Smullyan introduces a number of puzzles about liars and truth-
tellers to warm up the layman. Most of the events in the puzzles take place on an island,
viz., the Island of Knights and Knaves. On this imaginary island the following three
propositions hold:
1. Knights always make true statements.
2. Knaves always make false statements.
3. Every inhabitant is either a knight or a knave.
The aim of the puzzles is to decide whether an inhabitant is a knight or a knave using
the statements he makes. Assume that P is a native of the Island of Knights and Knaves.
Let k be the proposition that \P is a knight." Suppose P utters a proposition X . In
Smullyan's puzzles the reasoner knows neither the truth value of k nor the truth value of
X , i.e., he does not know whether the native is a knight or knave, and he does not know
if the asserted proposition is true or false. The only thing he knows is that P is a knight
if and only if X is true. So he knows that the proposition k  X is true. So the sentence
\P asserts X" is translated as k  X . We will show how this fact helps in the solution of
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the problem where the native P
1
states that he and his wife, P
2
, are both knaves. Now,
k
1
is the proposition that P
1
is a knight, and :k
1
that he is a knave. Similarly :k
2
is
the proposition that P
2
is a knave. Translating to symbolic logic, the reasoner knows that
k
1
 (:k
1
^ :k
2
). At this point, the domain of the problem changes from knowledge to
symbolic logic: Given two propositions k
1
and k
2
such that k
1
 (:k
1
^ :k
2
), what are
the truth values of k
1
and k
2
? Using a truth table one can easily verify that the only case
in which k
1
 (:k
1
^ :k
2
) is when k
1
is false and k
2
is true.
Although there is a very interesting translation here from the domain of knowledge to
the domain of symbolic logic, the question \Is this the way an intelligent agent handles
such problems?" should be carefully considered. Would an intelligent agent use a truth
table to decide who is lying and who is telling the truth?
In the solutions of some other epistemic puzzles, rather than explaining the way an
agent reasons throughout the puzzle, it is proven that the nal result that the agent has
reached is correct. For example, in the puzzle about cheating husbands this is done using
induction [34]:
The queen of the matriarchal city-state of Mamajorca, on the continent of
Atlantis, have a long record of opposing and actively ghting the male in-
delity problem. Ever since technologically-primitive days of Queen Henrietta
I, women in Mamajorca have been required to be in perfect health and pass an
extensive logic and puzzle-solving exam before being allowed to take a husband.
The queens of Mamajorca, however, were not to show such competence.
It has always been common knowledge among the women of Mamajorca that
their queens are truthful and that the women are obedient to the queens. It was
also common knowledge that all women hear every shot red in Mamajorca.
Queen Henrietta I awoke one morning with a rm resolution to do away with
the indelity problem in Mamajorca. She summoned all of the women heads-
of-households to the town square and read them the following statement:
\There are (one or more) unfaithful husbands in our community. Although
none of you knew before this gathering whether your own husband was faithful,
each of you knows which of the other husbands are unfaithful. I forbid you
to discuss the matter of your husbands delity with anyone. However, should
you discover your husband is unfaithful, you must shoot him on the midnight
of the day you nd about it."
Thirty nine silent nights went by, and on the fortieth night, shots were heard.
How did the wives decide on the indelity of their husbands?
As a solution to this problem, the theorem stating that if there are n unfaithful husbands
they will be shot on the midnight of the n
th
day, is proven. For n = 1 there would be
one unfaithful husband. His wife would immediately realize that he is the unfaithful one,
just after hearing the queen's statement, because she denitely knows that there is no
other unfaithful husband. Assume the claim holds for n = k, i.e., if there are k unfaithful
husbands they would be shot on the k
th
night. It could be proven that the claim also
holds if there are k + 1 unfaithful husbands. In that case, every cheated wife would know
k unfaithful husbands. As all the cheated wives are logically competent, they know that if
there are k unfaithful husbands then those husbands will be shot on the k
th
night. As none
of the cheated wives can prove that their husband is unfaithful, no shots are red during
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the rst k nights. Because no shots are red on the k
th
night, the cheated wives decide
that there are more than k unfaithful husbands and that their own husband is unfaithful
too. So the unfaithful husbands are shot on the k + 1
st
night.
However, rather than explicating how the cheated wives decide that their husbands are
unfaithful, this proof demonstrates that their decision is correct.
The third approach used in solving these puzzles is the most realistic one. It explains
how the agents in these puzzles reason about the situations they nd themselves in. A
slight blemish of this approach is that, it is informal. For example, the solution of the
puzzle where the native P
1
states that he and his wife, P
2
, are both knaves is given as
follows [42, p. 16]:
If the husband were a knight, he would never have claimed that he and his
wife were both knaves. Therefore he must be a knave. Since he is a knave, his
statement is false; so they are not both knaves. This means his wife must be
knight. Therefore he is a knave and she is a knight.
This informal solution seems to be the right way to handle these puzzles. What we will
try to do in the sequel is in some sense to formalize this using situation-theoretic concepts.
5.3 The Situated Approach
Situation theory, as mentioned earlier, is tailor-made for the problems involving knowledge
and information. It provides a group of features that motivated the design of the language
PROSIT which is especially suitable for writing commonsense reasoning programs.
One of these features is that \situations are rst-class citizens of the theory." This
feature combines reasoning in situations and about situations. More specically, situations
can be arguments to relations. Therefore situation theory should not only be considered
as a theory of relations in situations, but also of relations among situations.
Both individual and common knowledge are represented as situations. These situations
consist of a number of infons representing the facts an agent is aware of. So if Jack
knows that John has the ace of spades and that Mary has the queen of spades, then the
situation representing Jack's individual knowledge, i.e., jack knows, will consist of two
infons (discarding any unrelated stu):
(!= jack knows (has john ace of spades))
(!= jack knows (has mary queen of spades))
This representation is analogous to the denition of the the agents' knowledge in
epistemic puzzles. For example, Max's knowledge of the facts fact
1
, fact
2
, and fact
3
,
i.e., K
m
= ffact
1
; fact
2
; fact
3
g, is represented as (!= max knows (infon 1) (infon 2)
(infon 3)) where max knows stands for the individual knowledge of Max and infon i for
the the infon stating fact
i
.
An important advantage of using situations to represent knowledge is that it is possible
to express some statements that are not expressible in logic. For example, the statement
\I know a man who drinks wine every night."
can be most closely rendered in predicate logic by the following expression:
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(9x)[know(I; x)^ drinks wine(x)]
However, this expression can also be interpreted as: \I know a man, and that man drinks
wine every night. (I don't know whether he drinks wine every night.)"
1
Using situations
to represent knowledge we would use the following infons to express the statement.
(!= i know (man *x))
(!= i know (drinks wine *x))
On the other hand, if I didn't know whether he drinks wine every night, then the second
infon would not hold. (It would hold in that agent's individual knowledge who is aware of
that fact.)
Another feature of situation theory that helps formalize epistemic concepts is the gen-
eral treatment of partial information. As mentioned previously, situations are partial, i.e.,
they do not dene the truth or falsity of all relations on all objects in the domain. Assume
that there are two agents, Mary and John, facing each other stand in a room, and there
is a cat behind Mary. As John is seeing the cat, the situation that models his knowledge
will support the fact that there is a cat in the room:
(!= john knows (in room cat))
However, in the situation representing Mary's knowledge there should not be an infon
about the cat being in the room. When a query is made about the cat in the situation
representing Mary's knowledge, the answer should not be \no" but rather \unknown".
Additionally deductive omniscience and circularity of knowledge are handled elegantly.
Logical omniscience is supported by the feature of \informational constraints" in situation
theory. Constraints are the main tool for information ow. They are relations that hold
between two situation-types, therefore are also considered as infons. For example, if Jack
is aware of (or attuned to) the constraint that everything that smiles is happy, and knows
that John is smiling, then he deduces the fact that John is happy. The constraint is
represented as follows:
(resp jack knows (=> (smiles *X) (happy *X)))
The circularity of knowledge is modeled via \self-referential expressions" which is an-
other important feature of situation theory. Situations are members par excellence of
the ontology of situation theory; therefore, they can be used as constituents of infons.
This property makes it possible to dene circularity. For example, if common stands for
the situation holding the facts that are common to every agent, i.e., the common knowl-
edge situation, and jack knows stands for Jack's individual knowledge, then the following
expressions state that Jack knows everything that is common knowledge:
(!= jack knows common) or
([ common jack knows)
1
This is very similar to the argument Barwise advances about representing perception [4, p. 21].
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In PROSIT the second representation expresses the subchunk relation. It can be trans-
lated as \common is totally described by the infons in jack knows." So if (infon) holds
in common, then (!= common (infon)) holds in jack knows.
Using the subchunk relation it is straightforward to dene circularity. ([ jack knows
jack knows) will generate a self-referential situation, and as jack knows stands for the
individual knowledge of Jack, it will provide the circularity of Jack's individual knowledge.
So if Jack knows that Mary has the queen of spades, then all of the following infons will
hold:
(!= jack knows (has mary queen-of-spades))
(!= jack knows (!= jack knows (has mary queen-of-spades)))
(!= jack knows (!= jack knows (!= jack knows (has mary queen-of-spades))))
Jack knows that he knows that Mary has the queen of spades, he knows that he knows
that he knows that Mary has the queen of spades, and so on.
The nal feature of situation theory that led us to using it as a framework for epistemic
puzzles is the \situatedness of information and constraints" [31, 43]. Each infon or con-
straint exists in a situation (more formally, is supported by a situation). Consequently,
each infon or constraint has an interpretation according to the situation it exists in. This
can be considered as \context dependence" [1].
To clarify the argument above, consider a constraint that deduces facts about the height
of individuals. Let both Mike and John be 185 cm tall. Both are aware of the fact that
if someone is higher than 185 cm, then that individual is taller than Mike and John. The
following represents the constraint that is supported by Mike's (or John's) knowledge:
(resp mike knows (<= (taller *y *x)
(me *x)
(height *y *h)
(> *h 185)))
If John knows that Bob is 175 cm tall and Mike knows that Bill is 195 cm tall, then
Mike will deduce the fact that Bill is taller than himself, viz.
(!= mike knows (taller bill mike))
but John will not be able to deduce anything using the previous constraint.
The same argument holds for infons. Assume a case which Holmes and Watson are
working on. Consider a theft in which the door of the at that the thief broke into is not
fractured and that the windows are closed. Although both Holmes and Watson are aware
of these facts, only Holmes is able to deduce the fact that the thief had the key to the
door:
(!= holmes knows (no (broken door)) (closed windows))
(!= watson knows (no (broken door)) (closed windows))
This is because only Holmes nds out that the thief has a key, using the following
constraint:
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(resp holmes knows (=> (and (no (broken door))
(closed windows)
(has thief key))))
This example demonstrates that the same infon can generate dierent facts in dierent
contexts; a system should simulate this capability if it is trying to perform human-like
reasoning.
From the argument above, it can be concluded that the main advantage of using sit-
uation theory in representing knowledge is the conceptual clarity and elegance it oers.
Epistemic puzzles can be modeled without much eort. All the tools required for such
a modeling are already present in the domain of situation theory. This, as mentioned
numerous times throughout this paper, is due to the fact that situation theory is a natural
theory of information.
5.3.1 The Three Wisemen Problem
The solution of the \Three Wisemen Problem" [32] in PROSIT is, to our best knowledge,
the only serious attempt to use situation-theoretic constructs in the resolution of epistemic
puzzles. The main aim is to show how to use common knowledge computationally in
solving problems involving cooperation of multiple agents. It turns out that the situation-
theoretic aspects of PROSIT (reasoning about situations and in situations) generate an
intuitive and simple solution for this hypothetical problem [32, p. 79]:
Three wisemen are sitting at a table, facing each other, each with a white hat
on his head. Someone tells them that each of them has a white or red hat but
that there is at least one white hat. Each wiseman can see the others' hats
but not his own. If a fourth person asks them whether they know their own
color, then the rst two wisemen will answer no, but, after that, the third one
will answer yes.
The available facts in the problem can be categorized into two groups: facts that all
wisemen are aware of, and facts that are known individually. Facts such as that there are
three agents A, B, and C, that all agents are wise, and that each agent is wearing either a
white or a red hat are known by all three wisemen. On the other hand, the fact that say,
B and C are wearing white hats is known only by A.
There are two ways for an agent to decide that his hat is white. The rst is when the
other two wisemen have red hats. The second is when his assumption of having a red hat
causes a contradiction. The approach followed by [32] is to use the latter in order to solve
this problem. A assumes that he has a red hat. After B and C answers no, A concludes
that C should have said yes (because from B's answer C concludes that at least one of A
and C is wearing a white hat) if he were wearing a red hat. So he knows that he is wearing
a white hat. PROSIT's tree hierarchy of situations makes it rather easy to represent this
(Figure 5.1).
The program that models this puzzle has a deciency. It is not possible to distinguish
the following two cases that would result in dierent ways:
 The logicians answering the questions in sequence.
 The logicians answering all at the same time (in which case none of them can decide
on their color).
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AW
A.C A.C.B
Inheritance relation
Ownership relation
Figure 5.1: The Three Wisemen Problem. The facts known to all wisemen are kept in
situation W. The facts that A knows are kept in situation A. The facts that A knows that
C knows are kept in situation A.C. The facts that A knows that C knows that B knows
are kept in situation A.C.B.
5.3.2 Smullyan's Puzzles
These puzzles are epistemic in the sense that knights `reect' their individual knowledge
and beliefs while knaves `reect' the contrary of them. A simple puzzle of this type is the
following [42, pp. 15{16]:
The census-taker Mr. McGregor once did some eldwork on the Island of
Knights and Knaves. On this island, women are also called knights and knaves.
McGregor decided on this visit to interview married couples only. McGregor
knocked on one door; the husband partly opened it and asked McGregor his
business. \I am a census-taker," replied McGregor, \and I need information
about you and your wife. Which, if either, is a knight, and which, if either, is
a knave?"
\We are both knaves!" said the husband angrily as he slammed the door.
What type is the husband and what type is the wife?
The solution is as follows [42, p. 16]:
If the husband were a knight, he would never have claimed that he and his
wife were both knaves. Therefore he must be a knave. Since he is a knave, his
statement is false; so they are not both knaves. This means his wife must be
knight. Therefore he is a knave and she is a knight.
As it can be seen from the solution of the puzzle, when a reasoner is asked to solve
this puzzle he rst makes assumptions. Then based on these assumptions he considers a
hypothetical world and tries to nd out if there are any incoherencies in this hypothetical
world. If an incoherency exists he concludes that his assumption is wrong and totally
forgets about that hypothetical world. The reasoner continues to make new assumptions
(while learning something from the previous failures) until he nds all the solutions of the
puzzle, i.e., the coherent hypothetical worlds (Figure 5.2). In the puzzle above, rst it was
assumed that the husband is a knight, but this assumption led to failure because a knight
can never claim that he is a knave (an incoherency). So it was decided that the husband
is a knave.
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Husband (H)
Wife (W)
H: Knight H: Knave
H: Knight H: Knight H: Knave
W: Knight W: KnightW: Knave W: Knave
H: Knave
Second Assumptions
Sit2 Sit3 Sit4Sit1
First Assumptions
Figure 5.2: The hypothetical worlds created by the reasoner for the census-taker problem.
There is only one world (Sit4) coherent with the statement the husband uttered.
Examining the structure of these puzzles one will notice properties that are suitable
for a situation-theoretic representation:
 Actions always take place in a clearly dened context, i.e., the Island of Knights and
Knaves.
 There are abstract individuals, properties, and relations (e.g., being a knight, being
on the island, and so on).
 There are well-dened rules that invariably hold on the island (e.g., knights always
make true statements).
As mentioned previously, a system to solve these puzzles should be able to make human-
like reasoning. There are three main properties that enable PROSIT to simulate human-
like reasoning. The rst one is situated programming, i.e., infons and constraints are
local to situations. The second is PROSIT's situation tree structure, with which one can
represent nested knowledge/belief (e.g., \A thinks that B believes that C knows : : :").
The third is the use of incoherency to generate new information. Now, it is time to see
how PROSIT solves these puzzles. The following puzzle [42, pp. 23{24] will be exploited
to explain our approach:
This is the story of a philosopher|a logician, in fact|who visited the cluster
of islands and fell in love with a bird-girl named Oona. They were married. His
marriage was a happy one, except that his wife was too ighty! For example,
he would come home late at night for dinner, but if it was a particularly lovely
evening, Oona would have own o to another island. So he would have to
paddle around in his canoe from one island to another until he found Oona
and brought her home. [: : : ] On one occasion, the husband came to an island
in search of Oona and met two natives A and B. He asked them whether Oona
had landed on the island. He got the following responses:
29
; testing the coherency of a situation requires a
; translation of the uttered sentences to what they
; really mean
(! (resp island (<= (coherent)
(means P1 *sentence *translation)
(means P2 *sentence2 *translation2)
(and *translation *translation2))))
; every sentence uttered by a knight is true
(! (resp island (<= (means *x *sentence *sentence)
(says *x *sentence)
(knight *x))))
; any sentence uttered by a knave is false
(! (resp island (<= (means *x *sentence (no *sentence))
(says *x *sentence)
(knave *x))))
Figure 5.3: Three main constraints of the puzzle about Oona.
A: B is a knight, and Oona is on this island.
B: A is a knave, and Oona is on this island.
Is Oona on this island?
The solution of this puzzle will make use of various properties of PROSIT, including
inheritance. As the solution is based on creating hypothetical situations and testing their
coherency, it is useful to have a situation, say island, from which all the hypothetical
situations will inherit some essential facts that will not change from one situation to
another. For example, the fact that the native A says \B is a knight, and Oona is on
this island" will hold in every hypothetical situation. Therefore this fact is kept in island.
Similarly, the rules stating that knights always make true statements and that knaves
always make false statements are kept in island. The three main constraints used in the
solution of this puzzle are shown in Figure 5.3.
The rst step of the solution, i.e., making assumptions about the natives, is simulated
by creating hypothetical situations. Each hypothetical situation represents a dierent
combination of assumptions. A reasoner can assume the native A to be a knight or a
knave, the native B to be a knight or a knave, and Oona to be on the island or not.
So, the program will generate eight (2
3
) hypothetical situations. The following are two
hypothetical situations (Sit1, Sit2) that we will be examining throughout this section:
Sit1: (knight A) (knave B) (on island Oona)
Sit2: (knave A) (knave B) (not on island Oona)
The next step is to generate the infons that hold in the hypothetical situations. If
a knight makes a statement, it means that this statement holds in that situation. On
the other hand, if a statement is made by a knave, it is concluded that the negation of
that statement holds in the situation. So the following infons hold in the hypothetical
situations Sit1 and Sit2:
Sit1: (and (knight B) (on island Oona))
(no (and (knave A) (on island Oona)))
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Sit2: (no (and (knight B) (on island Oona))
(no (and (knave A) (on island Oona)))
The nal step is to check the hypothetical situations and to discard the ones that are
incoherent. The coherent situations are then the solutions of the puzzle. In the previous
case Sit1 is one of the incoherent hypothetical situations to be discarded, and Sit2 is a
solution (in fact, the only solution):
Sit1: (and (knight B) (on island Oona)) (from the second step)
(knave B) (from the rst step)
Incoherent!
Sit2: Coherent, therefore A and B are knaves and Oona is not on the island.
Smullyan's solution is as follows [42, p. 26]:
A couldn't possibly be knight, for if he were, then B would be a knight (as
A said), which would make A a knave (as B said). Therefore A is denitely
a knave. If Oona is on the island we get the following contradiction: It is
then true that A is a knave and Oona is on the island, hence B made a true
statement, which makes B a knight. But then A made a true statement in
claiming that B is a knight and Oona is on the island, contrary to the fact
that A is a knave! The only way out of the contradiction is that Oona is not
on the island. So Oona is not on this island (and, of course, A and B are both
knaves).
The simpler puzzle given earlier, i.e., the one about Mr. McGregor, is solved in a similar
fashion. There are two natives, H and W, in the puzzle. Each can be either a knight or a
knave. So there will be four hypothetical situations (Figure 5.2):
Sit1: (knight H) (knight W)
Sit2: (knight H) (knave W)
Sit3: (knave H) (knight W)
Sit4: (knave H) (knave W)
After the generation of new infons using the statement uttered by H, the hypothetical
situations will consist of the following:
Sit1: (knight H) (knight W) (and (knave H) (knave W))
Sit2: (knight H) (knave W) (and (knave H) (knave W))
Sit3: (knave H) (knight W) (no (and (knave H) (knave W)))
Sit4: (knave H) (knave W) (no (and (knave H) (knave W)))
Among these hypothetical situations the only coherent one is Sit3, which states that
H is a knave and W is a knight.
It is time to examine how PROSIT nds out about these incoherencies. As it is seen
from the examples above a distinguishing feature of PROSIT is that it allows incoherency
in situations. A situation may support both i and (no i). This should not be consid-
ered as a contradiction in the system, but merely a contradiction in the situation, which
means that the situation is incoherent (cannot be actual). This kind of incoherency can
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; if a native is a knight, he definitely is not a knave
(! (resp island (=> (knight *x)
(no (knave *x)))))
; if a native is a knave, he definitely is not a knight
(! (resp island (=> (knave *x)
(no (knight *x)))))
; (no (and *st1 *st2)) is equivalent to
; (or (no *st1) (no *st2))
(! (resp island (<= (means *x (or (no *st1) (no *st2)))
(says *x (and *st1 *st2))
(knave *x))))
; (no (or *st1 *st2)) is equivalent to
; (and (no *st1) (no *st2))
(! (resp island (<= (means *x (and (no *st1) (no *st2)))
(says *x (or *st1 *st2))
(knave *x))))
Figure 5.4: The constraints about negative knowledge.
be adequately used to get new information. In the example above, there is a situation
(Sit1) that supports both (knight H) and (knave H). (knave H) is equivalent to (no
(knight H)) (using the rules in Figure 5.4), therefore both (knight H) and its negation
are supported by the situation. The situation is incoherent and the assumptions have
failed. One nal comment on PROSIT is that it does not apply the predicate no over the
predicates and and or, therefore two additional constraints should be explicitly dened in
order to achieve this (Figure 5.4).
5.3.3 The Cheating Husbands Puzzle
The cheating husbands puzzle, studied in Section 5.2, is well-known from folklore [19] and
has long been the primary example to illustrate the subtle relationship between knowledge,
communication, and action in a distributed environment [16]. The puzzle involves an initial
step in which a set of facts is announced publicly, thereby becoming common knowledge.
Moses et al. [30], using a number of variants of the puzzle, try to describe what happens
when
1. synchronous communication,
2. asynchronous communication, and
3. ring-based communication
channels are used to communicate the protocol to be followed, i.e., announce the orders
of the queen. The distributed computational point of view is mainly interested in the types
of protocols, the delays and bounds in communication, and whether the communication
is fault-tolerant or not. For example, instead of making an announcement at the town-
square, the queen sends letters to all wives which makes the communication asynchronous.
Similarly, to test whether the system is fault-tolerant, another version of the puzzle in
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which wives are disobedient, i.e., wives that talk to each other about their husbands, is
used.
On the other hand, we are interested in the way agents reason about knowledge, as-
suming that communication is totally synchronous and reliable. We are using the puzzle
to illustrate how intelligent agents reason in a multi-agent system, and how they represent
each others' knowledge.
The tree wisemen problem is a special case of this puzzle where the number of agents
is restricted to three. In this puzzle all the wives in Mamajorca know each other. They
know that a husband is either faithful or unfaithful. On the other hand, none of the wives
know whether their husbands are faithful or not. Because all of these facts are common
to all the wives in Mamajorca, they are supported by the situation wives which holds the
infons that are common to all individuals in the puzzle. Some of the relations require an
argument that indicates the temporal location. The temporal location is represented by
an integer, n, which indicates the nth night after the queen has made the announcement.
Every silent night after the announcement is regarded as the wives not being able to decide
about their husbands delity. In modeling this puzzle, we are only interested in what the
the wives in Mamajorca know about the delity of the husbands in Mamajorca.
We now analyze the case where there are three unfaithful husbands. After the second
silent night following the announcement the queen made, b's (a wife) not knowing whether
her husband is faithful or unfaithful is represented as
(!= wives (no (!= b (faithful b 2))))
(!= wives (no (!= b (unfaithful b 2))))
Let a be one of the wives whose husband is unfaithful. Throughout the two silent nights
she knows who the other cheated wives are (say, b and c).
(!= a (unfaithful b 1))
(!= a (unfaithful c 1))
(!= a (unfaithful b 2))
(!= a (unfaithful c 2))
A wife whose husband is unfaithful, would realize this fact either if none of the other
wives are cheated (because the queen declared that there are some unfaithful husbands)
or if her assumption that her husband is faithful generates a contradiction. The latter can
be considered as proof-by-contradiction.
The way a wife decides that her husband is unfaithful is via making assumptions and
checking whether an assumption causes any incoherencies (Figure 5.5). Let a be the wife
who is reasoning. In the constraint that models the way a wife would reason in such a
situation, the premise (me *x) would bind *x to the situation this constraint is activated
in, e.g., a. The next two premises bind the variables *y and *z to the other cheated wives
b and c. The premises
(! ([ wives *y))
(! (@< wives *y))
indicate that b, i.e., the individual bound to the variable *y, knows that the facts supported
by wives are common to all wives (subchunk relation), and is aware of all the facts that are
33
; A wife knows that her husband is unfaithful if the
; assumption that her husband is faithful results in
; an incoherent situation.
(! (resp wives (<= (unfaithful *x *time)
(me *x)
(wife *y)
(wife *z)
(not (= *x *y))
(not (= *z *x))
(not (= *z *y))
(! ([ wives *y))
(! (@< wives *y))
(bind-lisp *pre (- *time 1))
(! (!= *y (faithful *x *pre)))
(transfer knowledge about third *y *z)
(incoherent *y))))
Figure 5.5: The constraint that decides the delity of a husband by making assumptions
and searching for incoherencies.
supported by wives (subtype relation). Next a assumes that her husband is faithful. She
knows that if her husband were faithful, the other wives would know it. In the program,
this assumption is made by asserting the fact that a's husband is faithful in the situation
that holds the facts that a knows that b knows, via the premise
(! (!= *y (faithful *x *pre)))
The variable *pre is assigned to the value *time 1 (using the bind-lisp predi-
cate that makes use of Lisp functions), where *time indicates the night on which the
reasoning is made. Moreover, the facts that a knows about c's husband are also as-
serted into the situation supporting the facts that a knows that b knows, because
what a knows about c's husband, b knows it too. This is achieved by the constraint
transfer knowledge about third. The nal step is to check if the assumption a made
would cause any incoherency. This is realized by the constraint incoherent which checks
if a situation supports a fact we know it does not support. It should be noted that this
rule implicitly expresses the fact that if someone is not faithful, he is unfaithful.
The constraint that transfers knowledge about the third individual (Figure 5.6) is a
good example of the use of the situation tree hierarchy. If a knows on the second night
after the announcement was made that b's husband is unfaithful then she knows that c
knows it too.
(!= a (unfaithful b 2))
(!= a (!= c (unfaithful b 2)))
So an infon supported by the situation a is copied to another situation a.c using the
procedure transfer knowledge about third .
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; A hypothetical situation is incoherent if it
; supports a fact we know it does not support.
(! (resp wives (<= (incoherent *y)
(no (!= *y *x))
(!= *y *x))))
; If the wives *x and *y know the character of the
; third wife's (*z) husband, they know that each of them
; knows it. So if (!= *x (character *z)), then
; (!= *x (!= *y (character *z))) should be asserted.
(! (resp wives (<= (transfer knowledge about third *y *z)
(or
(and
(character *character)
(*character *z *time)
(bind-lisp *pre (- *time 1))
(! (!= *y (*character *z *pre)))
)
(true)))))
Figure 5.6: Constraints that are used to nd incoherencies and to transfer knowledge
about the third party.
The constraint incoherent (Figure 5.6) checks whether a situation is coherent or not.
This is achieved by searching for an infon that is supported by that situation with both
positive and negative polarities.
To clarify the explanations made above, consider how a would reason until she nds
out that her husband is unfaithful. a knows that b and c are being cheated:
(!= a (unfaithful b 3))
(!= a (unfaithful c 3))
a wishes to learn whether her husband is faithful or not. She assumes that her husband
is faithful. She knows that if her assumption were true, then b would be aware of this
fact. She also knows that b knows the fact that c is being cheated.
(!= a (!= b (faithful a 2))) ; a's assumption
(!= a (!= b (unfaithful c 2))) ; transferred knowledge about c
b did not shoot her husband on the second night, i.e., she did not know that her husband
was unfaithful. So, an incoherency would occur, if she shot her husband on the second
night, i.e., if she knew that her husband was unfaithful. (This would make a's assumption
false, and mean that a's husband is unfaithful.) To decide on the truth of her assumption,
a should learn whether b could have decided that her husband is faithful or unfaithful. b
could decide about her husbands delity, just like a did. b would also assume that her
husband was faithful. Then b would know that c would also know this fact on the rst
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night after the announcement was made. b would also know that c would have known
that a's husband is faithful.
(!= a (!= b (!= c (faithful b 1)))) ; b's assumption
(!= a (!= b (!= c (faithful a 1)))) ; transferred knowledge about a
However this assumption of b would lead to a contradiction, because if c had known
that both a's and b's husbands are faithful, then she would have immediately decided that
her husband is unfaithful and shoot him.
Because of this incoherency, bmust decide that her husband is unfaithful, on the second
night, and shoot him. In other words, if a's assumption about her husband were true then
b would have shot her husband on the second night. But this did not happen, which means
that a's assumption that her husband is faithful fails. a's husband is unfaithful and she
shoots her husband on the third night after the announcement was made. Making the
same reasoning b and c also shoot their husbands.
5.3.4 The Facing Logicians Puzzle
The facing logicians puzzle is another famous puzzle which can be considered to be epis-
temic. The puzzle statement was given in Section 5.1. Assume that the rst logician, A,
has the number 4 on the card on his forehead, and the other logician, B, has the number
3.
A knows that the number on the forehead of B is 3, while the B knows that A has
the number 4 on his forehead. It is common knowledge to both of the logicians that the
numbers on their foreheads are positive. (Both of the logicians are aware of the fact that
common knowledge is common.)
(!= a (num b 3))
(!= b (num a 4))
(!= common (no (num a 0)))
(!= common (no (num b 0)))
([ common a)
(@< common a)
([ common b)
(@< common b)
Facts that are common knowledge are known by all the individuals and it is known
that these facts are common (Figure 5.7). The subchunk relation, [ , is used to indicate
that the individual knows that the facts supported by the situation common are common.
The subtype relation, @<, on the other, indicates that any infon that is supported by the
situation common is also supported by the situation representing the individual's knowledge.
It is also common knowledge that the numbers are consecutive. So if a logician knows
that the number on the forehead of the other logician is n and if he also knows that the
number on his own forehead is not n  1 then he denitely knows that the number on his
forehead is n+ 1.
Assume that B is the one who is asked if he knows what the number on his forehead is.
B would answer \no" because he does not have enough knowledge to make a decision. He
could only answer \yes" if the number on the forehead of A were 1. Then he could easily
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; if the number on the other logician's forehead is n and
; if the logician knows that the number on his forehead
; is not n-1, then the number on his forehead is n+1
(! (resp common (<= (know *x)
(me *x)
(logician *y)
(not (= *x *y))
(num *y *z)
(bind-lisp *a (- *z 1))
(no (num *x *a))
(bind-lisp *k (+ *z 1))
(! (num *x *k)))))
Figure 5.7: The constraint with which a logician nds out the number on his forehead.
(! (resp common (<= (no (know *x))
(me *x)
(logician *y)
(not (= *x *y))
(not (!= common (num *y *k)))
(no (num *y *z))
(bind-lisp *a (+ *z 1))
(! (!= *y (num *x *a)))
(! ([ common *y))
(! (@< common *y))
(incoherent *y)
(clear *y)
(not (num *x *s))
(! (!= common (no (num *x *a)))))))
Figure 5.8: The constraint that generates the numbers that cannot be on the forehead of
a logician.
deduce the fact that the number on his forehead was 2. B's answer, however, will make A
to learn that the number on his (A's) forehead is not 1.
How does A come to such a decision? Well, he makes assumptions about the number
on his forehead. He assumes that the number on his forehead is 1. If, it were so, then B
would know it. In the program this fact is asserted to the situation B.A which holds the
facts that A knows that B knows. A continues reasoning: \If B knew that the number on
my forehead were 1, would everything be as it is now? Would it cause any contradiction?"
So A tries to nd a contradiction in the facts that he knows that B knows. From his
previous answer A knows that B does not know what the number on his (B's) forehead is.
So A tries to prove that B would know the number on his (B's) forehead, if the number
on A's forehead were 1, and reach to a contradiction. B would know what the number
on his (B's)forehead is using the rule mentioned in the previous paragraph (Figure 5.7).
This kind of reasoning using incoherencies in situations is performed by the constraint in
Figure 5.8.
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a b
top
(no  (num  a  0))
(no  (num  b  0))
(no  (!= b (know b)))
common
(num  b  3) (num  a  4)
Figure 5.9: The situation tree shows the facts that A knows, B knows, and those that are
common.
To elucidate the way the program deduces the facts about the number on the forehead
of a logician, we examine in detail the situation in which a has 4 on his forehead, and
b has 3. In the beginning, it is common knowledge that none of the logicians have the
number 0 on their foreheads:
(!= common (no (num a 0)))
(!= common (no (num b 0)))
The situation tree is illustrated in Figure 5.9 where a and b are the situations that
support the facts known by A and B, and common denotes the situation supporting the
facts that are common to both agents. The dashed arrows indicate that both a and b are
inheriting the infons supported by common, i.e., both agents are aware of the facts that are
common, and know that these facts are common.
After B says \I don't know my number," the fact that the number on A's forehead is
not 0, turns out to be common knowledge (Figure 5.10):
(!= common (no (num a 1)))
Next, A says \I don't know my number," which means that the number on B's forehead
is neither 1 nor 2 (Figure 5.11):
(!= common (no (num b 1)))
(!= common (no (num b 2)))
Then, B once again says \I don't know my number," and it is concluded that the
number on A's forehead is neither 2 nor 3 (Figure 5.12):
(!= common (no (num a 2)))
(!= common (no (num a 3)))
At this moment, A deduces the fact that the number on his forehead is 4, because he
knows the facts that the numbers are consecutive, that B's number is 3, and that the
number on his own forehead is not 2 (Figure 5.13):
(!= a (num a 4))
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top
common
b
(num  a  4)
(no  (num  a  0))
(no  (num  b  0))
(no  (!= b (know b)))
a
(num  b  3)
b
(know  b)
(num  a  1)
Figure 5.10: A makes the assumption that the number on his forehead is 1, and reaches
to an incoherency.
ba
(num  b  3) (num  a  4)
common
(no  (num  a  0))
(no  (num  b  0))
(no  (!= a (know a)))
a
(num  b  1)
(know  a)
(no  (num  a  1))
(num  b  2)
top
Figure 5.11: B makes the assumption that the number on his forehead is 1 or 2, and each
time is led to an incoherency.
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top
ba
(num  a  4)
common
(no  (num  a  0))
(no  (num  b  0))
(no  (num  a  1))
(no  (num  b  1))
(no  (num  b  2))
(num  b  3)
(num  a  4)
(know  a)
b
(no  (!= b  (know  b)))
(num  a  2)
(num  a  3)
(know  b)
Figure 5.12: A nds out that the number on his forehead is neither 2 nor 3.
top
ba
(num  a  4)
common
(no  (num  a  0))
(no  (num  b  0))
(no  (num  a  1))
(no  (num  b  1))
(no  (num  b  2))
(num  b  3)
(num  a  4)
(know  a) (no  (num  a  2))
(no  (num  a  3))
Figure 5.13: A knows that the number on his forehead is 4.
Note that the logicians are making intelligent assumptions. If it is known that the
number on the forehead of A is not n, then B assumes that the number on his forehead
is n + 1. At the instant when it is known that the number on the forehead of A is not
0 and 1, B assumes that the number on his forehead is 1 or 2, which helps him reach an
incoherency, and derive new facts. However, B's assuming that the number on his forehead
is, say 8, would not help him much.
40
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper should be considered as a eld test on computational systems based on situation
theory [5, 8, 14, 15, 36, 52, 53]. Our primary aim was to analyze a language (PROSIT
[32, 33, 35]) which is based on situation theory and investigate applications that can grow
upon the tools situation theory provides. We chose epistemic puzzles [38, 39, 40, 42, 34, 19]
as the test domain, because these puzzles mainly study the knowledge individuals are
aware of and the way they reason about it. We believe that situation theory provides an
ontologically adequate framework to represent such puzzles.
Our results show that situation theoretic languages [32, 33, 35, 44, 48, 46, 50, 9, 10] are
suitable means for human-like reasoning. PROSIT is especially appropriate for problems
involving knowledge and belief. PROSIT provides some of the situation theoretic concepts
such as self-referential expressions, and situations as arguments of infons. Moreover, it
oers additional tools such as the situation tree hierarchy and the inheritance mechanism,
which make it easier to represent individual and common knowledge.
This paper is only an initial study on `real life' situation-theoretic applications. We
hope that this study will provide the necessary motivation for further investigation on the
computational systems based on situation theory and their deployment to model assorted
problems of knowledge representation. A logical next step in this regard will be to exercise
the capabilities of BABY-SIT [44, 48, 46].
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Appendix A
System Predicates in PROSIT
Here, we give a brief denition of some of the system predicates in PROSIT. All of these
are called by querying which can be done either at the top level (TOP) or within a situation.
Some system predicates may also be called by asserting them, but this is only useful if
the predicate has some side-eect, like printing something or asserting something into a
situation.
The following describes the eects and results of the system predicates when queried
in a situation s that is the interpreter's current focus of attention, also called the \current
situation."
A.1 Predicates for traversing the situation tree
(!= sit infon)
Asserting (!= sit infon) goes into sit (as described in the current situation s) and
asserts infon there. Asserting (!= sit infon) causes the query (!= sit infon) to succeed
thereafter (unless later retracted). (!= sit infon) expressions are not just system queries,
but also infons that can be supported by situations.
(IN sit)
Focuses the interpreter on sit , as described in the current situation s . Pushes s onto a
stack of situations. Remains in eect until an (OUT) or until the user-input loop is exited.
(OUT)
Focuses the interpreter's attention onto the topmost situation on the stack formed by
previous (IN sit)'s. The interpreter thus returns to the situation that we were focused
on before the IN that brought us here.
A.2 Database control predicates
(! infon1 : : : infonk)
When either asserted or queried, asserts infon1 : : : infonk (which could be a system
predicate like !=, <-, resp, rule, or [ ) in the current situation s . This may trigger the
application of forward-chaining rules.
Each infon is always queried before being asserted (note that backward chaining rules
may be used), and the assertion will not take place if the query succeeds.
(-! form)
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Removes from the current situation s all infons infon matching form that have been
explicitly asserted to be supported in s . Implicitly, infon will also be removed from the
supersituations of s , and (!= s infon) will be removed from any superchunks of s and
from the situation describing s .
A.3 Constraints
(<= head goal1 : : : goaln)
This is the form for backward-chaining constraints suitable as an argument to RESP or
RULE. However, if a <= infon is asserted in a situation, it automatically becomes respected
by that situation. So, in the current version there is no dierence between asserting (RULE
(<= : : :)) and (<= : : :).
(RESP sit constr)
When asserted, causes sit, as described in the current situation s , to respect the
constraint constr, which may be either a backward-chaining constraint (see above) or
a forward-chaining constraint (see below).
(=> head result1 : : : resultn)
This is the form for forward-chaining constraints suitable as an argument to RESP or
RULE. However, if a => infon is asserted in a situation, it automatically becomes respected
by that situation. So, in the current version there is no dierence between asserting (RULE
(=> : : :)) and (=> : : :).
(RULE constr)
When asserted, causes the current situation s to respect the constraint constr, which
may be either a backward-chaining or a forward-chaining constraint. (See above.)
When queried, succeeds if s has been asserted to respect constr.
A.4 Control predicates, logical connectives
(AND infon1 : : : infonk)
Identical to (! infon1 : : : infonk) when asserted.
When queried, succeeds if and only if all of infon1 : : : infonk succeed when queried,
in order. If any one fails, or if the entire AND is backtracked to, we backtrack through the
infoni's until we nd another solution or there are no more.
(OR infon1 : : : infonk)
Succeeds if any of infon1 : : : infonk succeed when queried. First tries infon1; if it fails,
or if the entire OR is backtracked to and there are no more solutions to infon1, goes on to
infon2, and so on.
(NOT goal)
Succeeds if and only if the given goal cannot be proven. Not the same as (NO goal),
which asks if we can prove the opposite of goal .
(CUT)
Succeeds. But if it is backtracked to, it not only fails but prevents further backtracking,
causing the higher-level goal (of which it is a part) to fail.
(FAIL)
Never succeeds.
(TRUE)
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Always succeeds.
A.5 Relations between situations
(@< sit1 sit2)
When asserted, causes the current situation s to describe that sit2 supports i for every
infon i valid in sit1 and that sit2 respects every constraint that is respected by sit1, i.e.
sit1 becomes a subtype of sit2.
(<- sit1 sit2)
The same as (@< sit1 sit2) except that only infons, but no constraints are inherited.
([ sit1 sit2)
When asserted, causes sit1 to be a subchunk of sit2. This means that sit1 is totally
described by the infons in sit2. If (!= sit1 infon) holds in sit2, then infon holds in sit1.
And vice versa if infon holds in sit1 then (!= sit1 infon) holds in sit2.
A.6 Unication
(= expr1 expr2)
Tries to P-unify expr1 and expr2. This is used both to assign a parameter to another
expression (number, string, list) and to bind two unassigned parameters together so that
they can be used interchangeably.
A.7 Using Lisp within PROSIT
(LISP expr)
Substitutes the variables in expression expr with their bindings. If the result is a valid
Lisp function call, then calls on Lisp to evaluate it. Succeeds if the Lisp call returns
non-nil. If a variable is unbound it is used as is.
(BIND-LISP var expression)
If var is a free variable, evaluates expression as a Lisp function (as in the lisp predicate
above) and binds var to the value returned by the function.
A.8 Interacting with PROSIT
(RUN)
Starts PROSIT from Lisp. May be queried within PROSIT to create a nested, clean,
empty sub-session. (Does not free stack space.)
(LOAD lename)
If lename is a string naming an existing le, reads PROSIT expressions in from the
le as if the user typed them, but does not print any output. Just as in user input, the le
may contain ?'s and !'s to switch between assertion and query modes, and it may contain
(in sit) and (out) instructions so that the le gets loaded into its own situation.
(DEMO lename)
If lename is a string naming an existing le, reads PROSIT expressions from the le
one at a time as if the user typed them, but waits for the user to hit return before executing
each one. Useful for demonstrating sequences of queries that show o one's programs.
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(PRINTSIT)
Prints out each of the infons, other than != or <- infons, which have been directly
asserted in the current situation as opposed to being inherited from subsituations or sub-
types.
(TRACE)
Puts PROSIT into a mode where a running trace is displayed of all queries, showing
when queries are called, when they are exited successfully, when they fail, and when they
are backtracked to in backward-chaining.
(DUALS)
Puts PROSIT into a mode wherein for each user query query , both the query and its
dual (i.e., (no query)) are evaluated. If just the dual succeeds, PROSIT answers \no"; if
both the query and its dual succeed, PROSIT answers \yes and no"; otherwise PROSIT
answers \yes" or \unknown."
EXIT
Exits PROSIT.
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